PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION/State of Mind Evidentiary Standards

SUBJECT: Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 . . . S. 240. Specter amendment No. 1485.

ACTION: AMENDMENT AGREED TO, 57-42

SYNOPSIS: As reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, S. 240, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, will enact changes to current private securities litigation practices in order to discourage unjust suits and to provide better information and protection from fraud for investors.

The Specter amendment would establish the evidentiary standards that might be used to determine a defendant's state of mind in those cases in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only by proving a particular state of mind. More specifically, for each allegedly fraudulent act or omission, the plaintiff could be allowed to allege facts: that showed the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud; or that constituted strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant. (This evidentiary standard was established in *Beck* v. *Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.*)

Those favoring the amendment contended:

Our disagreement appears to be slight. We are pleased that this substitute amendment adopts the most stringent pleading standard that has been set forth by any court for determining the state of mind of a defendant. That standard was established in *Beck*. However, we think the amendment should have gone a step further—it should have listed the evidentiary standards that were set forth in that case. The Specter amendment would correct this deficiency by noting that courts may use those specific evidentiary standards. Our colleagues believe this amendment is too restrictive, though they have not offered any reason why. We support the stringent pleading standard, we support the evidentiary standards that were given in the case that established this standard, and, in the absence of any arguments against this amendment, we intend to vote for it.

Those opposing the amendment contended:

(See other side)

YEAS (57)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (0)	
Republicans	Democrats (42 or 91%)		Republicans (38 or 72%)		Democrats (4 or 9%)	Republicans	Democrats (0)
(15 or 28%)						(0)	
Abraham Chafee Cochran Cohen Jeffords Kassebaum Lugar Mack McCain Packwood Roth Santorum Shelby Snowe Specter	Akaka Baucus Biden Boxer Bradley Breaux Bryan Byrd Conrad Daschle Dodd Dorgan Exon Feingold Feinstein Ford Glenn Graham Heflin Hollings Inouye	Johnston Kennedy Kerrey Kerry Kohl Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lieberman Mikulski Moseley-Braun Moynihan Murray Nunn Pell Pryor Robb Rockefeller Sarbanes Simon Wellstone	Ashcroft Bennett Brown Burns Campbell Coats Coverdell Craig D'Amato DeWine Dole Domenici Faircloth Frist Gorton Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg	Hatch Hatfield Helms Hutchison Inhofe Kempthorne Kyl Lott McConnell Murkowski Nickles Pressler Simpson Smith Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Warner	Bingaman Bumpers Harkin	VOTING PRE Bond EXPLANAT 1—Official I 2—Necessar 3—Illness 4—Other SYMBOLS: AY—Annou AN—Annou PY—Paired PN—Paired	TON OF ABSENCE Buisiness ily Absent nced Yea nced Nay Yea

VOTE NO. 293 JUNE 28, 1995

The Specter amendment would unduly burden plaintiffs. We support the high pleading standard in this bill, but we do not think it is fair to further burden plaintiffs by then specifying that they use the high evidentiary standard from the *Beck* case too. The Specter amendment, by codifying this language, would do more than suggest the use of this evidentiary standard; it would effectively compel it. We must therefore vote to reject the Specter amendment.